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WRITING RULES DOES NOT RIGHT WRONGS 
by ODEANA R. NEAL * 
I believe the work that lawyers, legal academics, and judges do is impor-
tant. Our work allows us to devise legal theories, develop litigation strategies 
and determine outcomes that can make a tremendous difference in people's 
lives. As a result, I applaud the insight and creativity of Judge Beck and 
Professors Glennon and Goldfarb. Their work demonstrates how law can be 
used to protect gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, their relationships and their 
families. 
Nevertheless, I write a cautionary tale. Those of us in the legal profes-
sion must take care that we do not overly depend on the degree to which law 
can transform a culture or society. While it is no new story that law and 
society interact with and affect one another, a set of legal rules not endorsed 
by a majority of the population-and particularly legal rules that a majority 
of the population is determined to thwart-cannot transform a society. We 
lawyers, legal academics, and judges then, should continue to do those things 
we do best, but we must do it knowing that if we are ahead of the curve of 
our communities on any issue, our work may not have the sweeping effects 
we sometimes imagine it will. Indeed, our efforts may create a backlash 
against our goals.1 
To illustrate this point, I look to the use of the "nexus" test some state 
courts use when deciding child custody disputes. In the circumstances I will 
discuss, a child's biological parents have lived together with the child in a 
marital or nonmarital relationship which is apparently heterosexual. During 
the course of the parents' relationship or sometime after the relationship has 
dissolved, one of the partners discovers or acknowledges his or her homosex-
uality or bisexuality. After dissolution of the parents' relationship, child cus-
tody and visitation decisions must be made. If the parents are not able to 
agree to a visitation schedule or agree upon who will receive physical or legal 
custody of any children, any unresolved matters will be decided by a court. 
This Essay will examine the role the sexual orientation of the nonheterosex-
ual parent should play in determining the custody of the child.2 
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank Pres-
ton Frazier for his ideas, Michael A. Dean for his extraordinary research assistance, Audrey 
McFarlane for her suggestions, and Venita E. George for her patience. 
1. See Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Discourse, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 679 (1996) 
(arguing that gay and lesbian civil rights movement must learn from failures and successes of 
African-American civil rights movement). 
2. This issue is often phrased in a slightly different manner: What role should sexual orien-
tation play in making child custody determinations? Since sexual orientation seems to make a 
difference in outcome only if a parent is homosexual or bisexual, however, I think it should be 
made clear that not all sexual orientations are at issue in child custody decisions. 
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Customarily, one of three different standards is used by a court in deter-
mining the relevance of a parent's sexual orientation on child custody dis-
putes: (1) homosexuality is used as a negative factor against awarding 
custody to a parent; (2) homosexuality can be considered a factor only to the 
degree that it can be shown to have an effect on the child's welfare; or (3) a 
parent's sexuality may not be considered at all in child custody disputes. 
Although gay and lesbian civil rights advocates have urged courts to take the 
position that sexual orientation should be irrelevant in making child custody 
decisions, none have done so. The majority of state courts which have ad-
dressed the issue have adopted the nexus test, that is, they have determined 
that sexual orientation may be taken into consideration when there is a nexus 
shown between the welfare of the child and the parent's sexual orientation.3 
A small minority of courts have determined that a parent's sexual orientation 
should be deemed a negative factor in deciding custody disputes.4 
Although the nexus test has the patina of being liberatory, it really is not 
much different than the use of nonheterosexuality as a negative factor. It is 
not very difficult to make arguments, at least in some circumstances, that a 
parent's homosexuality or bisexuality is a positive factor in determining child 
custody. For example, a gay or lesbian child might benefit from being in the 
custody of a parent whose orientation is the same. A gay parent, particularly 
one living in a committed relationship with a same-sex partner, might be able 
to better teach a child to overcome sex-role stereotypes. 
The simple fact of the matter, however, is that the nexus between a par-
ent's homosexuality or bisexuality is never determined to have a positive ef-
fect on a child's welfare, just as a parent's heterosexual orientation is never 
determined to have a negative impact on a child's best interests. Even in 
those instances where a gay or lesbian parent is awarded custody, this occurs 
because a court has determined that the parent's sexual orientation has not 
negatively affected a child, rather than because the parent's orientation has 
3. See J.B.F. v. J.M.F., No. 2960263, 1997 WL 564476 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 12, 1997); S.N.E. 
v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985); In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988); In re Marriage of R.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 
293 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990); Hassenstab v. 
Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A,2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1979); A,c. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 
503 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1986); Pulliam v. Smith, 476 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); 
Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Fox v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1995); 
A, v. A., 514 P.2d 358 (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Blew v. Verta, 617 A,2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); 
Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Van Oriel v. Van Oriel, 525 N.W.2d 37 
(S.D. 1994); Thcker v. Thcker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 605 A,2d 1331 
(Vt. 1992); Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978); M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. 
Va. 1987). 
4. See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding trial 
court's change in custody from lesbian mother to heterosexual father, because, inter alia, "homo-
sexuality is generally socially unacceptable" and because "it was contrary to the court's sense of 
morality to expose the children to a homosexual lifestyle"); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1980) (declaring that because of possible social stigma, mother's lesbianism was itself enough to 
determine that best interest of child would be met if custody were awarded to father). 
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had a positive effect. In other words, a parent's homosexuality has relevance 
only when it is deemed harmful to a child. As a result, trial courts are able 
to, and do, continue to use a parent's homosexuality as a negative factor, 
even though governing appellate court decisions would appear to forbid 
this.5 Any liberatory qualities attached to this test can be easily undermined. 
So is the answer to use a test which would forbid taking a parent's sexual 
orientation into account at all? I do not believe that it is truly possible to 
employ such a test. Even if a court does not, at least ostensibly, take a par-
ent's homosexuality or bisexuality into account, the parent's sexual orienta-
tion may playa significant role in how the court views the parent's character 
or behavior. For example, a court may determine that a parent should not 
have custody of a child because the parent maintains a nonmarital, live-in 
relationship with a member of the same sex. Of course, it is impossible for 
that parent to engage in a marital relationship with someone of the same sex, 
but the court will declare that it would view any non-marital cohabitation of a 
parent negatively. A court may equate the parent's homosexuality or bisexu-
ality with criminal sodomy, even if there has been no showing that the parent 
has engaged in any sexual activity with a member of the same sex and even if 
the state does not outlaw same-sex sexual practice. Further, a parent's polit-
ical involvement in gay causes may be viewed as a distraction from the par-
ent's ability to properly care for a child. 
The problem, then, is not with the legal test employed to determine the 
role of sexual orientation in deciding child custody disputes. Rather, the 
problem lies in the hearts and minds of those employing the tests. In other 
words, the real issue is not discrimination against lesbians, gay men and 
bisexuals, but the homophobia that creates the discrimination. That 
homophobia cannot be successfully combatted with judicial precedent. 
This is not to suggest that lawyers, judges, ·and academics interested in 
creating a nondiscriminatory legal climate should throw down their pens (or 
stop punching away at their computer keyboards) until homophobia and its 
vestiges have dissipated-it is possible that they never will. But what it does 
suggest is the need to educate and re-educate the general population from 
which judges are drawn about the truth and the fiction of nonheterosexual 
lives. We need to work toward the election and appointment of gay and les-
bian judges and judges who "get it" when it comes to the relevance and irrel-
evance of sexual orientation in decision-making. We also need to continue to 
strive toward making statutory changes because those changes, at least theo-
retically, reflect the thinking and support of the general population. It is only 
when judges and legislators are considered not to have done their jobs-
when they discriminate against gay men, lesbians and their families-that we 
5. For example, Ohio appellate courts had declared as early as 1987 that a parent's sexual 
orientation should not, by itself, determine the outcome of child custody disputes. See Conkel v. 
Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). Nevertheless, in 1997, the Court of Appeals of 
Ohio reversed a trial court's modification of custody because the trial court "appeared to have 
focused solely on appellant's sexual orientation." Inscoe v. Inscoe, No. 95CA12, 1997 WL 
346199, at *13 (Ohio App. 4 Dist. June 18, 1997). 
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lawyers and legal academics and judges can truly consider that our work has 
been done. 
